By: Jeffrey Backman, Esq. and Roy Taub, Esq.
In Catherine Pero v. Brown-Daub Chevrolet of Nazareth (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania confronted a question that continues to divide courts: does a text message qualify as a “telephone call” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)?
The court’s answer was clear: yes. But the path to that conclusion and the broader judicial disagreement make this decision particularly significant for TCPA litigants and compliance professionals.
Section 227(a)(4) defines “telephone solicitation” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message” for telemarketing purposes, which, according to this court, signals that Congress intended to regulate more than just voice calls. Although the TCPA does not define “telephone call or message,” the court read the phrase in light of ordinary meaning at enactment and the statute’s design to curb intrusive contacts using telephone lines. Relying on contemporaneous dictionary definitions, the court then reasoned that a text is a “message” transmitted by a “telephone,” bringing it within the statutory prohibition on unwanted telephone solicitations.
At the time of the TCPA’s enactment, “telephone” was commonly defined as a device for conveying sound to a distance, “call” as a telephone communication, and “message” as a communication sent from one person to another; the court concluded a text message fits the ordinary-meaning of “message” delivered via a telephone. The conclusion of the TCPA text message ruling is somewhat counterintuitive, however, considering that the court acknowledged that Congress could not have actually contemplated texting in 1991.
While the court recognized that Chevron deference has been abolished and that courts must now exercise independent judgment while giving agency interpretations respect proportional to their persuasiveness and expertise (Skidmore considerations), especially where Congress delegated rulemaking authority to implement statutory goals. Applying that framework and ordinary interpretive principles, the court accorded “considerable weight” to the FCC’s DNCR rules and text-related clarifications, concluding they fall within the statutory delegation and align with the statute’s privacy-protective purpose.
The court further recognized the ongoing split of authority on this TCPA text message ruling, observing that six circuits have recognized texts as calls, largely in § 227(b) cases, and that the Ninth Circuit post-Chevron recognized standing for unsolicited telemarketing texts under § 227(c). Post-McLaughlin district courts, including several within the Third Circuit, have also read § 227(c) to encompass texts, emphasizing the statute’s text, structure, and purpose. At the same time, courts have differed in how much weight to afford FCC interpretations in the post-Loper Bright era, with this opinion treating the Commission’s views as persuasive but not controlling and emphasizing independent judicial analysis.
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