By: Jeffrey Backman, Esq., Roy Taub, Esq., and Jacob Mars, Esq.
It remains a disputed issue whether a text message can provide the basis for a do-not-call claim under Section 227(c) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). In Siringi v. Crust Pizza Co., No. 4:25-CV-04266, 2026 WL 3392348 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2026), the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s TCPA claims, concluding that text messages do not constitute “telephone calls” for purposes of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s private right of action under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), but may be actionable on claims brought under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).
Plaintiff Cosby Siringi brought a putative class action against Crust Pizza Co., asserting claims under Sections 227(b) and 227(c) of the TCPA, as well as Texas Business and Commerce Code § 305.053. The central dispute concerned whether unsolicited text messages qualify as “telephone calls” under Section 227(c)(5). Siringi argued that longstanding judicial precedent, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) interpretations, and the TCPA’s statutory purpose supported treating text messages as telephone calls. The Court disagreed. In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized Congress’s deliberate use of different terminology throughout the TCPA. Specifically, while Section 227(c)(5) limits the private right of action based upon the receipt of “telephone calls,” other provisions use the broader term “telephone solicitation,” which Congress expressly defined to encompass a telephone “call or message.”
Notably, the Court declined to follow a contrary decision from the same district, Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., No. 7:25-CV-00343, 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), finding the Seventh Circuit’s statutory interpretation in Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, 182 F.4th 532 (7th Cir. 2026), more persuasive. The Court also rejected Siringi’s reliance on Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent recognizing text messages may be actionable under other TCPA provisions, explaining that those decisions addressed Section 227(b), rather than Section 227(c)(5).
The Court separately dismissed Siringi’s Section 227(b) claim because he failed to sufficiently allege the use of an automatic telephone dialing system and abandoned the claim by failing to defend it. However, the Court declined to dismiss his Texas statutory claim, explaining that Texas law independently permits actions based on violations of applicable FCC regulations, even where no privately actionable federal claim exists. The Court reserved ruling on that claim and ordered supplemental briefing concerning jurisdiction.
The decision adds to a developing judicial divide over whether text messages fall within Section 227(c)(5)’s private right of action and highlights the continuing importance of statutory language in determining the reach of the TCPA’s various provisions.
To discuss TCPA compliance or a pending matter, please contact Jeffrey A. Backman, co-chair of the Class Action Defense practice group at [email protected].
This publication is provided by Greenspoon Marder LLP is issued for informational purposes only and is not intended to be construed or used as general legal advice nor a solicitation of any type. Please contact the author(s) or your Greenspoon Marder LLP contact if you have any questions regarding the currency of this information. The hiring of a lawyer is an important decision. Before you decide, ask for written information about the lawyer’s legal qualifications and experience.
